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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Weston Lloyd Ballard appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation and executing his underlying sentence for felony DUI.

Ballard also

challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the
appellate record with transcripts of his original sentencing hearing, his rider
review hearing, and his first probation violation disposition hearing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In June 2008, a law enforcement officer observed a vehicle driving in the
middle turning lane. (PSI, p.2. 1) The officer activated his overhead lights and
attempted to pull the vehicle over. (ld.) The officer ran the license plate number
through dispatch and was informed that the vehicle had been reported stolen.
(ld.) The officer followed the vehicle until it came to "almost a complete stop," but
the vehicle then accelerated and drove into oncoming traffic. (ld.) The officer
pursued the vehicle for several miles and several other officers joined the pursuit.
(ld.) Throughout the pursuit, the vehicle traveled at a speed of 90 miles per hour
in traffic. (Id.) While officers continued to pursue the vehicle, the driver began
"flashing gang signs" and he threw debris from the vehicle onto the road. (ld.)
The pursuit ended when the driver, who was later identified as Ballard, attempted

1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"39242-2011-STATE V BALLARD-confidential exhibits.pdf."
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to make a turn at approximately 50 miles per hour and lost control of the vehicle.
(Id.)

Officers immediately drew their weapons as Ballard exited the vehicle

shouting "shoot me, shoot me" and he began walking towards the officers. (ld.)
The officers holstered their guns and drew their tazers. (ld.) Ballard refused to
comply with the officers' commands and he was tazered. (ld.) The officers then
took Ballard into custody and transported him to the hospital where he was
medically cleared before being transported to jail. (ld.)
The state charged Ballard with receiving or transferring stolen vehicles,
felony fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, and felony DUI. (R., pp.5253.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ballard pled guilty to felony DUI and the

amended charge of misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer.
(R., pp.57-62.)

In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the receiving or

transferring stolen vehicles charge and recommend that the sentences on the
remaining charges run concurrently. (R., pp.58-59.) The district court imposed a
unified sentence of seven years with three years fixed on Ballard's felony DUI
conviction and a sentence of 90 days jail time on Ballard's fleeing or attempting
to elude a peace officer conviction. 2 (R., pp.85-87.) The district court ordered
those sentences to run concurrently and retained jurisdiction. (R., p.86.)
In March 2009, Ballard completed his rider and the district court placed
him on probation for five years. (R., pp.94-96.) Approximately five months later,

Ballard is not appealing his sentence for fleeing or attempting to elude a peace
officer. (Appellant's brief, p.2.)

2

2

the state filed a report of probation violation alleging that Ballard violated the
conditions of his probation by consuming alcoholic beverages, failing to
successfully complete the New Directions Aftercare program, failing to attend
group sessions at Four Directions Treatment Center, changing his residence
without first obtaining written permission from his probation officer, and failing to
maintain contact with his probation officer. (R., pp.1 08-1 0.)
Before the admit/deny hearing was held on those probation violations, the
state filed an addendum to the report of probation violation alleging that Ballard
violated the conditions of his probation by failing to obey all laws after Ballard
was charged with DUI, felony aggravated assault, and misdemeanor battery.
(R., pp.129-30.) Ballard entered denials on the alleged probation violations and
the district court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.132-34.) At
the evidentiary hearing, Ballard admitted to violating his probation by drinking
al.cohol, failing alcohol treatment, changing residences without permission, and
being convicted of "an alcohol related offense," resist and obstruct, and battery
and the district court continued Ballard on probation. (R., pp.162-63.)
Approximately one year later, the state filed another report of probation
violation alleging that Ballard violated the conditions of his probation by
assaulting a woman and taking her vehicle without permission, consuming
alcoholic beverages, failing to complete the Aftercare program at Four Directions
Treatment Center, failing to provide proof that he completed 60 hours of
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community service, and operating a motor vehicle without valid driving privileges.
(R., pp.190-202.) Prior to the admit/deny hearing on those probation violations,
the state filed an addendum to the report of probation violation alleging that
Ballard violated the conditions of his probation by changing his residence without
first obtaining permission from his probation officer, failing to report to his
probation officer as directed, and absconding from supervision. (R., pp.205-07.)
Ballard denied the allegations and the matter was set for an evidentiary hearing.
(R., p.212.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the state withdrew two of the alleged probation
violations and the district court found that Ballard violated the conditions of his
probation by failing to complete the Aftercare program at Four Directions
Treatment Center, failing to provide proof that he completed 60 hours of
community service, being convicted of the new crimes of domestic battery, theft
by extortion and driving without privileges, changing his residence without
notifying his probation officer, failing to report to his probation officer as directed,
and absconding from supervision. (R., p.214; Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.11, L.21; p.15,
Ls.13-15.)
At the disposition hearing, the district court revoked probation and
executed the underlying unified sentence of seven years with three years fixed
on Ballard's felony DUI conviction.

(R., pp.231-34; Tr., p.30, Ls.2-6.) Ballard

timely appealed. (R., pp.237-38, 244-47.)

4

After the appellate record was settled, Ballard filed a motion to augment
the record with transcripts of his original sentencing hearing held on August 25,
2008, his rider review hearing held on March 2, 2009, and his prior admit/deny
and disposition hearing held on February 26, 2010. (Motion To Augment And To
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed March
15, 2012.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied the motion. (Order Denying Motion
To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule, entered April 6, 2012.)

5

ISSUES
Ballard states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Ballard due process
and equal protection when it denied his motion to augment
with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Ballard's probation and failed to reduce his sentence sua
sponte upon revoking probation?

(Appellant's brief, p.5)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Does the Idaho Court of Appeals lack the authority to review the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision to deny Ballard's motion to augment the
record?

2.

Has Ballard failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
by revoking his probation or by failing to reduce his sentence sua sponte?

6

ARGUMENT
I.

If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals, That Court Lacks The
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision To Deny Ballard's
Motion To Augment The Record

A.

Introduction
Ballard contends that by denying his motion to augment the appellate

record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has effectively
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.616.) Should this case be assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, however, that
Court lacks the authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny
Ballard's motion.

Furthermore, even if the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of

Ballard's motion is reviewed on appeal, Ballard has failed to establish a violation
of his constitutional rights.

B.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals, Should It Be Assigned This Case, Lacks The
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision
Recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals "disclaim[ed] any authority to review

and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision on a motion made prior
to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the
Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other
law." State v. Morgan, No. 39057, 2012 WL 2782599, at *2 (Ct. App. July 10,
2012). Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the
7

Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision
and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court."

Jst

However, the Idaho Court of Appeals did leave open the possibility of
review of such motions in some circumstances.

Jst Such circumstances may

occur, the Court indicated, where "the completed appellant's and/or respondent's
briefs have refined, clarified, or expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to
demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts, or where new
evidence is presented to support a renewed motion."

Jst

In the present case, however, the briefing has not demonstrated the need
for the requested transcripts, and Ballard has not provided new evidence to
support any renewed motion. In his motion to augment, Ballard requested the
transcripts of his original sentencing hearing held on August 25, 2008, his rider
review hearing held on March 2, 2009, and his prior admit/deny and disposition
hearing held on February 26, 2010. (Motion To Augment And To Suspend The
Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed March 15, 2012.)
Ballard argued that the transcripts were necessary because "[u]nless made part
of the record, they will be presumed to support the district court's order executing
Mr. Ballard's sentence, which is now on appeal." (ld.) The Idaho Supreme Court
denied the motion. (Order Denying Motion To Augment And To Suspend The
Briefing Schedule, entered April 6,2012.)

8

Because the Idaho Court of Appeals does not have the authority to review
and, in effect, reverse a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, and because
Ba"ard has failed to provide any new evidence or clarification in his Appe"ant's
brief that would permit the Idaho Court of Appeals to do so, the Idaho Court of
Appeals must decline to review the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of Ba"ard's
motion to augment the record.

C.

Even If The Merits Of Ba"ard's Argument Are Reviewed On Appeal,
Ba"ard Has Failed To Show The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477

(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. "linois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956». The state, however,
"wi" not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper,
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted»; Lane, 372
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12.
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To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show
that any omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal.
State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968)
(distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)); see also
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 97 (1 st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice
Ballard "must present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts
were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002).
Ballard has failed to carry this burden.
Ballard argues that he is entitled to the requested transcripts because he
"spoke to the district court" at the August 25,2008 sentencing hearing, he "spoke
on his own behalf' at the March 2, 2009 rider review hearing, and he "admitted to
violating the terms and conditions of his probation" at the February 26, 2010
admit/deny and disposition hearing. 3 (Appellant's brief, p.12.) However, there is
no evidence that the district court had such transcripts when it revoked Ballard's
probation in August 2011, or that it relied upon anything said at the previous
hearings as a basis for its decision to finally revoke Ballard's probation and order

Ballard also argues, "The transcript of the January 28, 2008, sentencing
hearing is necessary because trial counsel addressed the court in mitigation.
Additionally, a transcript of the September 8, 2008, probation violation admission
hearing is relevant because mitigation arguments were made in favor of Mr.
Ballard." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) However, it does not appear from the record
that any hearings were held on those dates (R., pp.1-2) and Ballard did not
request any such transcripts in his motion to augment (Motion To Augment And
To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed
March 15, 2012).
10
3

his sentence executed. In short, Ballard has failed to show that the requested
transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate for appellate review
under the facts of this case.

As such Ballard cannot show that the Idaho

Supreme Court's denial of his motion to augment prejudiced his ability to pursue
the appeal.
Ballard has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment
the record on appeal denied him equal protection. There is nothing in the record
that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ballard's request
solely because he is indigent.

The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party

seeking augmentation to set forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation
requested. I.A.R. 30. Ballard's motion to augment was denied because he failed
to meet this minimal burden, imposed upon all parties, of showing that the
requested transcripts were necessary or even helpful in addressing appellate
issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order properly denied the motion to augment
because Ballard failed to make a showing that any appellant - indigent or
otherwise - would be entitled to augment the record as requested.
Ballard has failed to show that transcripts of hearings held between one
and three years prior to the district court's decision to revoke his probation are
necessary to decide the only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction in this
appeal, nor has he demonstrated that the denial of his motion to augment was in
any way influenced or decided by his indigence.
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To the contrary, the record

amply demonstrates that Ballard's motion to augment was properly denied
because he failed to show that the transcripts he requested were necessary for
adequate review of the district court's order revoking Ballard's probation.
Because Ballard has failed to show his due process and equal protection rights
were implicated, much less violated, by the denial of his motion to augment, he
has failed to show any basis for relief.

II.
Ballard Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Revoking His Probation Or By Failing to Reduce His Sentence Sua Sponte
A.

Introduction
Ballard contends that "the district court abused its discretion when it

revoked his probation and executed the underlying sentence without sua sponte
reducing it in light of the mitigating factors present and the district court's
mistaken belief that Mr. Ballard had previously participated in two riders in this
case." (Appellants brief, p.16.) The record, however, supports the district court's
decision to revoke probation and order the underlying sentence executed without
reduction. Ballard has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district

court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106,233 P.3d 33, 37 (2009) (quoting State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)). Upon revoking
12

Ballard's probation, the district court had the authority, pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 35, to sua sponte reduce the underlying sentence imposed upon his
conviction for felony DUI. I.C.R. 35; State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 400, 179
P.3d 360, 363 (Ct. App. 2008). The decision of whether to do so was committed
to the district court's discretion and, as such, Ballard bears the burden on appeal
of establishing that the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte
reducing his sentence.
C.

kl

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Revoking Ballard's
Probation And Ordering The Underlying Sentence Executed Without
Reduction
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v.
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,325,834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,
115 Idaho 1053, 1054,772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.

State v.

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717.
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
13

State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)).

A court's

decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive.
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27,218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant
to "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover,
140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are: "(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing."

lsL.

The reviewing court "will examine the entire record encompassing events

before and after the original judgment," i.e., "facts existing when the sentence
was imposed as we" as events occurring between the original sentencing and
the revocation of probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28,218 P.3d at 8.
The district court's decision to revoke Ballard's probation was primarily,
and properly, based on Ballard's excessively poor performance on probation and
his "lengthy criminal history." (See Tr., p.26, L.17 - p.28, L.23.) The district court
initially placed Ballard on probation after he completed the retained jurisdiction
program.

(R., pp.94-96.)

Approximately one year later, Ba"ard admitted to

several probation violations and the district court continued Ballard on probation.
(R., pp.162-63.)

However, Ballard continued to violate the conditions of his
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probation by continuing to consume alcohol and by committing the crimes of
domestic battery, theft by extortion and driving without privileges. (R., pp.190207,214; Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.11, L.21; p.15, Ls.13-15.) As the district court noted,
Ballard's new convictions involved "violent, serious charges.,,4 (Tr., p.27, Ls.2122.) Ballard also failed to complete his substance abuse treatment while he was
on probation and he absconded from supervision.
Ls.10-13.)

(Tr., p.27, Ls.17-20; p.28,

Ballard was "denied admission into the problem-solving courts"

because he is "too criminal and too nonresponsive to community-based
interventions." (Tr., p.28, Ls.14-17.)
The district court ultimately determined that "it's obvious, Mr. Ballard, that
based on your performance and when I review the objectives of criminal
punishment as well as the criteria under Idaho Code 19-2521, that probation
simply is not an option." (Tr., p.29, Ls.15-19.) The district court recognized that
there are some new retained jurisdiction programs that Ballard did not have the
opportunity to participate in when he went on his two prior riders in 2001 and
2009, but the district court determined that a third retained jurisdiction program
would not be appropriate. (Tr., p.29, L.20 - p.30, L.1.) As such, the district court
exercised its discretion and revoked Ballard's probation. (Tr., p.30, Ls.2-6.)

4 Those charges involved an incident in which Ballard "struck" a woman "in the
face with closed fists, drug her by the hair, and kicked [her] in the face and
abdomen." (R., p.191.) Ballard also threatened the woman "by telling her that he
had a knife and that he was going to stab her and kill her." (ld.) The victim
"suffered a fracture[d] nose and rib, a split lip and bruising on her face, arms, legs
and body." (ld.)
15

Ballard contends that the district court abused its discretion in light of
mitigating factors.

(Appellant's brief, p.16.)

However, the district court

appropriately weighed all of the relevant factors before deciding to revoke
Ballard's probation and order the underlying sentence executed without
reduction.

The district court had already given Ballard the opportunity to

participate in the retained jurisdiction program and the district court reinstated
Ballard's probation following his first set of probation violations. The district court
thoroughly considered Ballard's difficulties with alcohol and recommended that
Ballard "be considered for treatment in the Therapeutic Community in the prison
setting." (Tr., p.29, LsA-5; p.30, Ls.3-6.) The district court told Ballard, "if you're
serious about what you've told me here today, it's time to just work on you and
see if you can get a handle on this, and hopefully you can do it in this setting."
(Tr., p.30, Ls.9-12.) Although Ballard seems to recognize that he needs help to
overcome his alcohol issues (see Tr., p.19, L.11 - p.26, L.7), it is clear from the
record that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant
Ballard another opportunity at probation or the retained jurisdiction program.
Ballard also argues that the district court mistakenly thought that it had
already retained jurisdiction twice in this case.

(Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.)

Review of the record, however, shows Ballard has taken the district court's
statement out of context. The presentence investigation report noted that Ballard
"went on a rider in 2001" and then recommended in this case that the district

16

court retain jurisdiction.

(PSI, pp.S, 12.)

The district court followed that

recommendation. (R., p.S6.) At Ballard's second probation violation disposition
hearing, the district court correctly set forth the procedural history of this case
and stated that it "retained jurisdiction" at the original sentencing hearing and
"then on the 2nd day of March, 2009, the Court placed you back on probation .... "
(Tr., p.26, L.21 - p.27, L.16.) The district court stated that Ballard violated the
conditions of his probation and the district court "continued" him on probation on
February 26,2010. (Tr., p.27, Ls.6-16.) The district court then outlined the new
probation violations that were the subject of the disposition hearing. (Tr., p.27,
L.17 - p.2S, L.13.)

Nowhere in the district court's recitation of the procedural

history of this case does the district court state that it had retained jurisdiction two
times after Ballard was convicted of felony DUI in August 200S. (See Tr., p.26,
L.17 - p.2S, L.13.)
Ballard argues that the district court's statement that "this was your
second rider that you had done in this case" indicates that the district court
mistakenly believed it had already retained jurisdiction twice in this case and
Ballard had already been on three riders, including his rider in 2001. (Appellant's
brief, p.16; Tr., p.2S, Ls.21-22.) However, when the district court's statement is
read in context, it is clear that the district court understood that Ballard had been
sent on one rider in 2001 and one rider in 2009. The district court's full statement
was, "You've done -

you did a rider in 2001. So this was your second rider that
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you had done in this case." (Tr., p.28, Ls.21-22.) That statement was correct.
Ballard's rider in this case was his second rider because he also went on a rider
in 2001. The district court's statements that "[a]s indicated, you've been on two
retained jurisdiction programs" and a "third retained jurisdiction" would not be
appropriate "in this matter" were also correct (Tr., p.29, L.20 - p.30, L.1.) When
all of the district court's statements are taken in context, it is clear that the district
court was referring to the fact that Ballard's rider in this case was his "second
rider" because he had previously been sent on a rider in 2001.
The record does not support Ballard's claim that the district court
misunderstood the procedural history in this case.

Even if he could establish

such an error it was harmless because the record shows that another period of
retained jurisdiction would not be appropriate.

Ballard's belief that he should

have a third opportunity to participate in the retained jurisdiction program despite
his multiple probation violations does not establish an abuse of discretion.
Because Ballard has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in
revoking his probation and ordering his sentence executed without reduction, he
is not entitled to relief.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order revoking Ballard's probation
DATED this 4th day of September 2012
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